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Abstract More than 65 potentially active volcanoes on the Kamchatka Peninsula and the
Kurile Islands pose a substantial threat to aircraft on the Northern Pacific (NOPAC),
Russian Trans-East (RTE), and Pacific Organized Track System (PACOTS) air routes. The
Kamchatka Volcanic Eruption Response Team (KVERT) monitors and reports on volcanic
hazards to aviation for Kamchatka and the north Kuriles. KVERT scientists utilize real-time
seismic data, daily satellite views of the region, real-time video, and pilot and field reports of
activity to track and alert the aviation industry of hazardous activity. Most Kurile Island
volcanoes are monitored by the Sakhalin Volcanic Eruption Response Team (SVERT)
based in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. SVERT uses daily moderate resolution imaging spectrora-
diometer (MODIS) satellite images to look for volcanic activity along this 1,250-km chain
of islands. Neither operation is staffed 24 h per day. In addition, the vast majority of Russian
volcanoes are not monitored seismically in real-time. Other challenges include multiple
time-zones and language differences that hamper communication among volcanologists and
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meteorologists in the US, Japan, and Russia who share the responsibility to issue official
warnings. Rapid, consistent verification of explosive eruptions and determination of cloud
heights remain significant technical challenges. Despite these difficulties, in more than a
decade of frequent eruptive activity in Kamchatka and the northern Kuriles, no damaging
encounters with volcanic ash from Russian eruptions have been recorded.
Keywords Volcanic ash and aircraft safety  Kamchatka volcanoes 
Kurile volcanoes  Ash clouds  Volcano hazard warnings  Volcano hazards 
Aviation safety
Abbreviations
ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center
ASTER Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer
AVHRR Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer
AVO Alaska Volcano Observatory
CWSU Center Weather Service Unit
FIR Flight Information Region
IATA International Air Transport Association
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
KVERT Kamchatka Volcanic Eruption Response Team
MIS Meteorological Impact Statement
MTSAT Multi-Functional Transport Satellite
MWO Meteorological Watch Office
MODIS Moderate Resolution Imagine Spectrometer
NOPAC North Pacific
NOTAM Notice to Airmen
OMI Ozone Monitoring Instrument
PACOTS Pacific Organized Track System
RTE Russian Trans East (air routes)
RACGAT Russian American Coordinating Group for Air Traffic
SIGMET Significant Meteorological Information
SVERT Sakhalin Volcanic Eruption Response Team
TFR Temporary Flight Restriction
USGS US Geological Survey
UUA Urgent Pilot Report
VAA Volcanic Ash Advisory
VAAC Volcanic Ash Advisory Center
1 Introduction
Commercial air transport in the Northern Pacific constitutes one of the world’s busiest
passenger and cargo markets (Airbus 2008). At the end of 2007, more than 200 flights per
day travel over or immediately down wind of Russian volcanoes (Fig. 1). The high volume
of traffic and few alternate airports over this vast oceanic terrain amplify the risk of an
encounter with volcanic ash that could lead to in-flight engine failure and other damage to
aircraft systems. The development of two volcanos monitoring and reporting scientific
organizations in the Russian Far East has significantly mitigated this risk. As evidence,
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despite the rapid growth in air traffic during a time of frequent Russian eruptions over the
past 15 years, to our knowledge, no damaging encounters with volcanic ash from Russian
volcanoes have occurred (IAVWOG 2008; Neal 2003).
This paper reviews the current status of technical volcano monitoring and operational
Russian eruption warnings geared toward aviation interests in the Northern Pacific.
Although the impacts of Russian eruptions can extend thousands of kilometers downwind
for the largest of events, here we consider this region to include Canadian, US, Russian,
and Japanese airspace adjacent and immediately downwind of the Kurile, Kamchatka, and
Alaskan volcanoes. We discuss interconnected roles and responsibilities among entities
from three countries, all which have key roles in the warning process, and highlight
important ongoing challenges.
2 Kamchatkan Volcanic Eruption Response Team (KVERT)
Following several dangerous encounters between aircraft and ash in the late 1980s and
early 1990s (Miller and Casadevall 2000), the US Geological Survey (USGS) and its
cooperators recognized the need to expand volcano monitoring and eruption reporting to
include the highly active and explosive volcanoes of Kamchatka (Fig. 2). Russian scien-
tists had long conducted scientific investigations and seismic monitoring of many
Kamchatkan volcanoes, however, reliable and consistent English-language eruption
reporting mechanisms geared for the aviation industry did not exist. In 1993, USGS and
Russian volcanology counterparts in the Institute of Volcanic Geology and Geochemistry
(IVGG) and the Kamchatka Experimental and Methodical Seismological Department
Fig. 1 Schematic portrayal of principal flight routes in the Northern Pacific region. Red triangles are
potentially active volcanoes. The NOPAC consists of five labeled fixed tracks and nine transition routes
from Alaskan airspace to destinations in Asia. G583 is a principal Russian Trans East (RTE) route. The two
northerly NOPAC routes (R220 and R580) are westbound only primarily to avoid the normal jet stream
position. A590 is eastbound only. R591 and G344 are bidirectional depending on the location of the Pacific
Organized Track System (PACOTS), time of day, and traffic load. The PACOTS tracks (not shown) are
routes that connect the west coast of the US and the NOPAC. These ‘‘flextracks’’ are generated daily based
on winds. Depending on how far north PACOTS tracks are located, many additional aircraft could be at risk
of an ash cloud encounter
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(KEMSD) established the KVERT project (Kirianov et al. 2002). IVGG and KEMSD were
scientific research organizations within the Russian Academy of Science, and both orga-
nizations contributed staff who worked part-time on KVERT-related monitoring and
reporting duties. IVGG members of KVERT were volcanologists familiar with
Fig. 2 Map of Kamchatkan volcanoes and schematic representation of principal NOPAC (green) and RTE
(red) air routes in the immediate vicinity of the Peninsula. G583 is bi-directional. B240, B932, R220, and
R580 are westbound only. As of late 2007, B932 is still considered a demonstration route. B240 opened in
October 2007 and is expected to receive significant traffic loads
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Kamchatka’s volcanoes and able to prepare English-language alerts regarding volcanic
activity. KEMSD’s research laboratory of seismic and volcanic activity hosted volcano
seismologists who maintained seismic networks, conducted daily data analysis and, in
addition to other duties and geophysical research programs, collaborated with IVGG staff
to issue volcanic activity forecasts and interpretive statements.
The first year of KVERT operation saw major eruptions from Klyuchevskoy in 1994
(Miller and Casadevall 2000) and Bezymianny in 1995 (McGimsey and Neal 1996). Both
eruptions produced significant ash clouds that reached 10 km in altitude or more and
stretched for more than 1,000 km across air routes of the North Pacific significantly dis-
rupting flights. The Klyuchevskoy eruption resulted in a single, non-damaging aircraft-ash
encounter, the only encounter on record for Russian eruptions (IAVWOG 2008). Shev-
eluch, Klyuchevskoy, Bezymianny, and Karymsky volcanoes remained frequently active
for the first decade of KVERT’s operation. The lack of further incidents demonstrated the
effectiveness of increasingly close cooperation and communication among Russian and US
aviation, meteorology, and volcanology partners.
In 2004, IVGG merged with another scientific group, the Institute of Volcanology, to
form a single Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (IVS). KEMSD was renamed the
Kamchatka Branch of Geophysical Surveys (KBGS). By this time, KBGS had developed a
capability to process and analyze NOAA Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer
(AVHRR) satellite images received from the Kamchatkan Center for Communications and
Monitoring. This provided an important complement to its seismic monitoring and now
KBGS seismic analysts scan AVHRR imagery each day to look for thermal anomalies or
evidence of ash. They compare brightness temperature data of optically opaque ash clouds
in suitable images to atmospheric profiles in order to estimate the altitude of ash cloud tops.
In 2004, IVS scientists in KVERT began to receive raster Moderate Resolution Imaging
Spectrometer (MODIS) images from NASA satellites processed by colleagues at DalIn-
formGeoCenter of the Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia. By 2007, IVS had arranged
to receive its own AVHRR and MODIS data feed from a different source in Russia, and
IVS KVERT staff routinely examined satellite data for evidence of volcanic activity. IVS
KVERT staff also receives and processes NASA-Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade,
and Industry (METI) Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer
(ASTER; Yamaguchi et al. 1998; Gillespie et al. 2005) and Ozone Monitoring Instrument
(OMI; Levelt et al. 2006) data on occasion to examine high-resolution thermal and sulfur-
dioxide signals related to Kamchatkan volcanic activity.
The backbone of volcano monitoring in Russia is the network of about 30 real-time
seismometers installed and maintained by KBGS in close proximity to 10 of the nearly 30
active volcanoes in Kamchatka and Alaid Volcano on Atlasova Island (Fig. 2). An 11th
volcano, Kizimen, is minimally monitored by a single seismic station located 20 km from
the volcanic cone. All seismic data are evaluated daily to characterize activity at each
volcano (Fig. 3). KBGS also maintains three web-cameras from continuously staffed
seismic stations near Klyuchevskoy, Bezymianny, and Sheveluch volcanoes (Fig. 4).
These images and the on-line video generation capability have proven extremely useful to
operational users and aviation concerns around the world.
Presently, KVERT consists of about five scientists from IVS and about five scientists
from KBGS, all located in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. Students in volcanology and
related disciplines from Kamchatka State University are occasionally employed by
KVERT. IVS staff on Paramushir Island reports periodic observations of Ebeko and
Chikurachki volcanoes. IVS and KBGS field station scientists in settlements near Klyu-
chevskoy and Sheveluch volcanoes provide reliable, expert sources of ground-observations
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 atad etilletaS atad lausiV yticimsieS seonacloV
Sheveluch Above background levels. 
~165 seismic events into the edifice of the volcano. 
Shallow events, indicating possible ash-gas explosions up 
to 5000m ASL or avalanches. 
Weak intermittent spasmodic volcanic tremor. 
04:37 - shallow event, indicating possible ash-gas 
explosion ~6500m ASL or avalanche, then height of ash 
cloud was less than ~6500m. 
20:50 – series shallow events, indicating possible ash-gas 
explosions ~6500m - 10000v ASL or avalanches, then 
height of ash cloud was less than ~6500m – 10000m. 
04:00 obscured. 
20:00 obscured. 
Thermal anomaly: NOAA17:
09:23 – 4 pixels through the 
clouds, peak reading of (20.2 
C), background of (-10 C). 
 Klyuchevskoy At background levels. Weak seismic events into the edifice of the volcano. 
Weak continuous spasmodic volcanic tremor. 
04:00 obscured. 
20:00 obscured. 
No thermal anomaly observed.
Obscured by clouds. 
Bezymianny Slightly above background levels. 
EQs: 1 - Ml≥1.25.
06:00 – 23:00 no data 
07:00 obscured. 
20:30 obscured. 
No thermal anomaly observed.
Obscured by clouds. 
Plosky
Tolbachik
No detectable seismicity. 
06:00 – 23:00 no data 
07:00 quiet 
20:30 obscured. 
No thermal anomaly observed.
Obscured by clouds. 
Kizimen No detectable seismicity. 06:00 – 23:00 no data 
 No data. No thermal anomaly observed.
Obscured by clouds. 
Karymsky Above background levels. 
~500 weak local shallow Eqs. 
Intermittent spasmodic volcanic tremor. 
Possible weak ash-gas explosions and avalanches. 
05:12; 03:20 - shallow events, indicating possible ash-gas 
explosions ~2300m and 2900 ASL accordingly and 
avalanches.
No data. 
No thermal anomaly observed.
Obscured by clouds. 
Koryaksky  .teiuq 00:50 .yticimsies elbatceted oN 20:00 quiet. 
No thermal anomaly observed.
Avachinsky  .teiuq 00:50 .slevel dnuorgkcab tA 20:00 quiet. 
No thermal anomaly observed.
Gorely 05:00 quiet. 20:00 quiet. 
No thermal anomaly observed.
Mutnovsky Slightly above background levelsWeak continuous spasmodic volcanic tremor. 
05:00 quiet. 
20:00 quiet. 
No thermal anomaly observed.
Alaid  .atad oN .slevel dnuorgkcab tA No thermal anomaly observed.
Fig. 3 Sample of a daily summary of seismic, AVHRR satellite, and web camera (video) observations and
data for Kamchatkan volcanoes. These summaries are prepared by scientists of KBGS and emailed to many
operational users each day
Fig. 4 Sample image form a KBGS web camera located in the community of Klyuchi, *46 km south of
Sheveluch Volcano. In this image, a towering column of ash rises from the Sheveluch lava dome. KVERT
scientists use these data during clear weather to track activity and to estimate plume height and composition
(e.g. ash or gas/steam only). For volcanoes with frequent explosive activity such as Sheveluch, KBGS has
also used plume height data from web camera imagery to calibrate the correlative seismic signal. This can
then be applied at night and in bad weather to estimate possible plume heights
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and photographs. Although reachable by cell phone, KVERT is not routinely staffed 24 h
per day.
In the early days of KVERT, an eruption in Kamchatka would prompt a fax or phone call to
the Alaska volcano observatory (AVO) in Anchorage, Alaska, who in turn would rebroadcast a
facsimile to a list of aviation users and notify key government agencies by telephone. Now, more
than 300 users including US aviation and meteorological authorities receive email notification
directly from KVERT and KBGS. AVO continues to re-broadcast formal KVERT information
releases by facsimile and these notices are also posted on the AVO web site. Additionally, AVO
notifies key government agencies in the US and Canada following significant volcanic events in
Russia. By 2006, KVERT’s web page hosted timely English-language text messages and
photographs of current activity. KVERT also shares a weekly summary of volcanic activity in
Kamchatka with Kamchatkaeronavigatsia, the local aviation authority.
In the event of an eruption or change in a volcano’s status or color code, KVERT IVS
staff shares information domestically via telephone, first notifying the Meteorological
Watch Office (MWO) at Yelizovo Airport. The MWO is then responsible for contacting air
traffic control in Petropavlovsk which is also located at Yelizovo Airport. Subsequent
Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) distribution by the MWO via the
Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network has improved over the years, and SIG-
METs are now issued promptly following most reports of ash producing events in
Kamchatka. Urgent email messages describing unrest or actual eruptions are sent by both
IVS and KBGS staff of KVERT to the Tokyo and Anchorage Volcanic Ash Advisory
Centers (VAACs), AVO staff and duty scientists, the Center Weather Service Unit
(CWSU) at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Route Traffic Control Center
(ARTCC) in Anchorage, and other aviation interests (e.g. airline dispatch offices) upon
request. KVERT also is responsible for alerting the Kamchatka Emergency Services
Agency regarding any significant changes in volcanic activity. A generalized schematic
illustrating the flow of information for KVERT is summarized in Fig. 5.
KVERT funding has been a mixture of basic Russian Academy of Sciences support
from the host Institutes augmented on occasion by the local Kamchatka Administration, the
International Air Transport Association, and the US Agency for International Development
(USAID). The largest source of ongoing operational support has been the FAAR (Federal
Aviation Authority of Russia), now called the Federal Unitary Enterprise State Air Traffic
Management (ATM) Corporation of Russia, through its regional organization Kamchat-
aeronavigatsia. During calendar year 2006, KVERT received *$23,000 from the ATM
Corporation; annual support has risen to $35,000 in 2008. These funds cover Institutional
overhead, field, and laboratory equipment, partial support for seismic and other telemetry,
data processing, telecommunications, and salary supplements for KVERT staff. Much of
the scientific staff time for KVERT work is supported directly from IVS and KBGS.
Growth of the KVERT budget through time to allow for expanded monitoring has been
limited, although some augmentation of monitoring networks has occurred through aca-
demic collaborations with US earth scientists (e.g. Ramsey and Dehn 2004; West et al.
2007; Carter et al. 2008). KVERT has had to suspend operations several times due to a
lapse in operational funding, most recently for a month in the spring of 2007.
Formal agreements between the US FAA and the Russian FAAR reached at Russian
American Coordinating Group for Air Traffic (RACGAT) meetings were instrumental in
leveraging support for KVERT from the FAAR in the past. Additionally, ongoing advo-
cacy by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA), International Air Transport Association (IATA), and various airlines have been
important in maintaining government funding for KVERT.
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3 Sakhalin Volcanic Eruption Response Team (SVERT)
The Kurile Island chain stretches 1,250 km from the tip of Kamchatka to the island of
Hokkaido in Japan (Fig. 6; Gorshkov 1970). At least 36 active volcanoes occur in this
portion of the Pacific Rim, most on uninhabited, remote islands, but all are within 500 km
of NOPAC air routes between North America and Asia (Neal et al. 2008a, b). In 1981, a
significant explosive eruption from the northernmost Kurile island volcano, Alaid, pro-
duced an ash cloud that spread across a large area of Russian and US airspace in the North
Pacific. A similar eruption today would severely impact the heavily travelled northern
NOPAC routes as well as several of the busiest air routes within the Russian Far East.
Recognizing that Kurile volcanoes presented a serious threat to aviation, KVERT and
AVO colleagues met in Petropavlovsk and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in 2003 to discuss a Kurile
volcano monitoring and eruption response team. The Institute of Marine Geology and
Geophysics (IMGG), another Russian Academy of Sciences member based in Yuzhno-
Sakhalinsk on the Island of Sakhalin, emerged as a logical home for this group. IMGG
employs volcanologists, remote sensing specialists, and others experienced with the history
and character of Kurile volcanoes. Following further discussions, IMGG announced the
creation of SVERT in 2004 (Rybin et al. 2004). The mission of SVERT was to use all
available and accessible monitoring data to detect and track activity at Kurile volcanoes,
issue warning messages to aviation and other authorities, and to provide expert information
about Kurile eruption histories and volcano behavior.
SVERT’s monitoring program includes analysis of twice-daily NASA MODIS satellite
imagery obtained from the ROSGEOLFOND (part of the Russian Ministry of Interior) in
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. Only Alaid in the far north Kuriles is considered seismically moni-
tored by a single real-time seismometer (and these data are telemetered to KBGS in
Fig. 5 Generalized information flow diagram for Kamchatkan volcanic activity
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Petropavlovsk). Three regional seismic stations operated by the Sakhalin Experimental,
and Methodical Seismological Department are located on Kunashir, Iturup, and Paramushir
islands, but they are too far from volcanic centers to be useful in routine monitoring. Staff
at seismic sites in Kurilsk and Yuzhno-Kurilsk on Iturup and Kunashir islands, respec-
tively, can be contacted by telephone if activity is noted or suspected. Near-real-time
earthquake plots from the University of Hokkaido in Japan that cover the southern Kurile
region are consulted on occasion by SVERT staff via the Internet. Unfortunately, field-
intensive installation and telemetry for seismic monitoring networks on most of the remote
Kuriles are prohibitively expensive at this time. Thus, SVERT relies nearly entirely on
MODIS satellite monitoring with occasional ground-based reports from colleagues on the
inhabited southern islands (Rybin et al. 2004). This lack of ground-based instrumentation
means that at present, SVERT cannot confidently forecast eruptive activity by detecting
precursory seismic or geodetic signals, nor will they receive instantaneous instrumental
confirmation of an eruption in progress.
Fig. 6 Map of Kurile volcanoes (red asterisks) and approximate position of principal NOPAC (green) and
RTE (red) air routes. Route names circled; triangles are air navigation fixes. See Figs. 1, 2
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Daily satellite summaries—similar to those prepared by KBGS for Kamchatka but
including only analysis of MODIS images—are shared via email with KVERT and AVO
staff who also scan available imagery of the Kurile region as part of daily monitoring
duties (Rybin et al. 2004). SVERT has prepared a concise operational plan for responding
to a detected eruption. Protocols include: (1) telephone notification of the Yuzhno-Sa-
khalinsk Air Traffic Control authority at the Yuzhno-Sakhalin airport to prompt an urgent
pilot report; (2) email alerting of relevant VAACs, ARTCCs, CWSU, KVERT, and AVO;
(3) Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Meteorological Center is notified by fax and telephone to prompt
issuance of a SIGMET; and (4) the Sakhalin Emergency Committee and administration of
IMGG are notified by phone. AVO is prepared to post SVERT eruption messages on its
web site and relay information to others as appropriate, in a manner similar to how AVO
handles KVERT information. A summary of information flow for SVERT is in Fig. 7.
SVERT scientists also engage in volcanologic field work and related research under the
auspices of IMGG. As such, they are the most knowledgeable source of information about
past behavior and likely eruption styles for Kurile volcanoes. Despite an average of just
under one eruption per year over the last century, Kurile volcanoes have been very quiet
since SVERT began operation in 2004. Weak, possible steam and or gas explosions have
been detected in MODIS imagery in 2004 (Neal et al. 2005) and again in 2006 (Neal et al.
Fig. 7 Generalized SVERT information flow diagram for volcanic activity in the Kurile Islands; KVERT
could also be the first to spot activity in the Kuriles and by agreement they will contact the MWO in
Petropavlovsk and also SVERT in Sakhalin. KVERT is formally responsible for reporting activity on
Paramushir and Atlasova Islands in the far northern Kuriles (see Figs. 2, 6)
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2008a, b). However, these events have been too minor and uncertain to have activated and
tested communication protocols.
SVERT consists of several scientists who share daily satellite analysis and reporting
duties. SVERT receives no supplemental funding from Russian aviation authorities and
relies solely on base funding from its host Institute. A one-time assistance grant of
*$18,000 from the US Agency for International Development, Office of US Foreign
Disaster Assistance through the USGS helped establish basic infrastructure of the SVERT
team and communication protocols. SVERT leadership attended the 2004 International
Symposium on Volcanic Ash and Aviation Safety (http://www.ofcm.noaa.gov/ICVAAS/
Proceedings2004/ICVAAS2004-Proceedings.htm) to learn operational details about global
aviation and volcano hazards. SVERT staff members have visited AVO to learn about
satellite volcano monitoring techniques and interagency coordination regarding aviation
warnings. Despite persistent efforts by the SVERT director and allies at KVERT and AVO,
securing funding for monitoring and reporting functions has been unsuccessful to date.
Further, SVERT has also not been formally recognized as a State volcano observatory by
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a pre-requisite to applying for
reimbursement of partial operational expenses as an air navigation service.
4 Relationship with MWOs and ARTCCs
Meteorological Watch Offices (MWOs) around the world are the primary, federal-level
weather-agency entity charged with issuing a volcanic ash SIGMET, the formal notifica-
tion of ash cloud hazard, location, and forecasted motion that is sent to the aviation
industry during a volcanic eruption. Accordingly, volcano observatories worldwide must
develop effective working relationships with MWOs. KVERT and the 24 h MWO located
at Yelizovo International Airport adjacent to Petropavlovsk have established good lines of
communication and protocols for interaction. The Yelizovo MWO shares pilot reports of
volcanic activity with KVERT and usually coordinates with KVERT prior to the issuance
of SIGMETs. The Yelizovo MWO is in direct contact with Petropavlovsk ARTCC who is
responsible for issuing urgent pilot reports. KVERT notifies the MWO immediately by
telephone if evidence of volcanic unrest or ash clouds is detected.
For Kurile eruptions, SVERT has worked to improve preparedness by developing a
communication plan and educating MWO and ARTCC staff about Kurile volcanoes and
likely eruption scenarios. Any Kurile eruption will likely involve coordination across
adjacent air traffic control regions and both the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and the Petropavlovsk
ARTCCs and MWOs (the line of demarcation occurs at 150E which bisects Urup Island in
the southern Kuriles; Fig. 6). A Kurile eruption response exercise in late October 2007
highlighted key areas where additional pre-event coordination is needed. The authors
recommend that this test be conducted periodically to maintain communication links and
test procedures.
5 Relationship with VAACs, Anchorage CWSU
In 1993, ICAO, in cooperation with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO),
established the requirement for Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers (VAACs) as part of the
International Airways Volcano Watch Program. VAACs are responsible for providing
formal international notification of the location and forecast motion of volcanic ash
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clouds for different regions of the planet. Under this framework, the Tokyo VAAC is
responsible for ash clouds produced by Russian volcanoes in the Northern Pacific;
Anchorage and Washington and Montreal VAACs are also involved if clouds propagate
far enough to the east or south from Russian volcanoes, a common occurrence espe-
cially for larger eruptions. Communication among KVERT, SVERT, and these
meteorological outlets is thus critical to providing timely and accurate warning mes-
sages for aviation.
To that end, the 24 h Tokyo VAAC office is notified immediately by email from both
KVERT and SVERT upon detection of precursory volcanic unrest, verification of eruptions
and ash clouds, or detection of seismicity that might indicate the presence of ash clouds. In
addition to these alerts, Tokyo VAAC also utilizes Multi-Functional Transport Satellite
(MTSAT) imagery (Oshima 2002) to detect ash clouds and issue notifications based on its
own analysis. There is presently limited dialogue between Tokyo VAAC and KVERT or
SVERT regarding volcano information to discuss and verify, for instance, potential ash
clouds detected by the Tokyo VAAC. This is due in large part to language differences and
the cost of telephone communications. With the extensive experience gained from ongoing
eruptions in Kamchatka, however, the Tokyo VAAC is an effective, proactive, consistent
source of Volcanic Ash Advisories (VAAs). To date, the Tokyo VAAC has not had to issue
any advisories regarding Kurile activity.
The Anchorage and Washington VAACs and the Anchorage CWSU also receive email
notification from KVERT regarding volcanic activity and will receive email alerts directly
from SVERT when a Kurile event occurs. For redundancy, AVO contacts the Anchorage,
Washington, and Montreal VAACs and the Anchorage CWSU by telephone for all Russian
volcanic events of significance to aviation (usually ash suspected or confirmed above 6 km
or 19,700 ft ASL). Finally, the Anchorage and Tokyo VAACs communicate with each
other via facsimile to ensure coordination across VAAC boundaries.
6 Interaction with the AVO
Close collaboration among KVERT, SVERT, and AVO is necessary because of the
common drift of Russian ash clouds toward and into US airspace. A formal agreement of
operations between KVERT (its component Institutes KBGS and IVS) and AVO is revised
periodically to outline roles and responsibilities. As of yet, there is no formal agreement
between AVO and SVERT. All cooperative work between scientists of the US Geological
Survey and the Russian Academy of Sciences is conducted under a formal Memorandum
of Understanding between the US and Russian governments. As part of this relationship,
AVO communicates with KVERT frequently (and with SVERT to a lesser degree) by
email which has largely replaced phone calls as the primary means of contact. KVERT and
SVERT staff are encouraged to call AVO, however, when significant changes in volcano
status occur. AVO shares its twice-daily satellite analyses of Kamchatka and some Kurile
volcanoes with Russian colleagues to provide additional sources of observations for the
region. AVO staff can serve as the conduit for feedback from English-speaking aviation
and meteorological authorities, and the airlines, in the aftermath of Russian eruptions.
KVERT, SVERT, and AVO occasionally exchange personnel for organizational famil-
iarization and training, discussion of the particular needs of aviation industry with regard to
volcanic activity warnings, strategic planning, and collaborative research (West et al.
2007).
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7 Examples of recent Russian eruption responses
7.1 Bezymianny May 2006
One of the most active volcanoes of Kamchatka in recent decades, Bezymianny is famous
for its March 30, 1956 catastrophic landslide, accompanying debris avalanche, and lateral
blast (Gorshkov 1959; Bogoyavlenskaya et al. 1991). Since then, intermittent lava extru-
sion has produced a dome that periodically collapses generating pyroclastic flows and
short-lived ash plumes (Carter et al. 2008). Importantly, the active lava dome tends to emit
large amounts of thermal energy in the days to weeks prior to an explosive dome collapse
event (Senyukov 2006; Carter et al. 2007). The May 2006 explosive event at Bezymianny,
described below, is an excellent illustration of the use of satellite data in conjunction with
seismic monitoring and a long term understanding of eruptive patterns to forecast a
potentially dangerous ash cloud.
On April 7, 2006, after several months of low-level unrest, KVERT reported a new
‘lava block’ or spine extruding from a north–south fissure across the summit of the lava
dome and indicated that the volcano was moving towards an explosive eruption. On May 3,
KBGS staff shared a forecast of an eruption within the next 4 weeks citing increasing
seismicity; this information was circulated internally among KBGS, IVS, and AVO staff
by email. Based on this, KVERT formally announced an increased likelihood of explosive
eruption within the next 4 weeks in an Information Release sent to the normal distribution
list on May 5. Seismicity began to increase still further and on May 7, KVERT raised the
level of concern color code to ORANGE and reported an increasing number of hot ava-
lanches from the unstable dome. Fumarolic plumes containing ash rose above the summit
and numerous shallow earthquakes were recorded under the volcano. Two days later, after
the appearance of intermittent spasmodic tremor, a strong thermal anomaly, and a
continuing high level of avalanche activity, KVERT declared level of concern color code
RED and indicated that an explosive eruption was possible in the next several days.
The forecast was correct and on May 9, at 0821 UTC, an explosive eruption lasting
*30 min sent ash to 15 km above sea level. The ash cloud extended south-southeast and
then later northeast from the volcano. Satellite images tracked this cloud for more than
500 km. In response, the Alaska Aviation Weather Unit issued a series of SIGMETs and
Tokyo VAAC issued seven Volcanic Ash Advisories. Several air carriers rerouted their
planes to avoid the ash cloud. A pilot report of ash between an estimated 12–14 km ASL
about 400 km west of Shemya in the far western Aleutian Islands was followed within a
few hours by a National Weather Service ash fall advisory for the western Aleutians. The
level of concern color code for Bezymianny reverted to ORANGE on May 10 and
YELLOW on May 11 as seismicity returned to background levels and quiet effusion of lava
likely resumed at the lava dome.
7.2 Klyuchevskoy 2007
Klyuchevskoy is another Kamchatka volcano that has repeatedly tested the Russian vol-
cano warning system for aviation. A classic, symmetrical stratocone with a summit
elevation of 4,750 m, it is the highest of the active European and Asian volcanoes.
Klyuchevskoy is frequently active with explosions and occasional lava flow production
from the main vent in the steep-walled summit crater or from flank vents (Khrenov et al.
1991). Explosive eruptions have occurred in nearly every decade and at multiple times
during most years since the early 1700s (Simkin and Siebert 1994).
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Following a vigorous phase of lava fountaining and explosions in January–March, 2005
(McGimsey et al. 2007), Klyuchevskoy Volcano remained at level of concern color code
GREEN until seismicity began to increase in mid-December 2006. Based on this, KVERT
elevated the volcano to YELLOW on December 19 where it remained through the end of
the year and into 2007. Ash explosions, incandescence in the crater, intensive thermal
anomalies in satellite imagery, and increasing seismicity prompted declaration of color
code ORANGE on February 15, 2007. For the next several months, intermittent activity
produced ash clouds that seldom rose above 6,500 m; however, KVERT continued to warn
of the possibility of a significant ash hazard. Daily emails described observed ash clouds,
lava flows, and related activity.
On May 17, KVERT sent a formal notice of color code RED based on increasing
amplitude of volcanic tremor and an observed ash plume to 10 km above sea level.
Satellite data showed an ash cloud extending downwind more than 500 km. Vigorous,
nearly continuous ash producing eruptions lasted until early June when activity decreased
slightly and KVERT reduced the level of concern to ORANGE. KVERT reinstated RED in
late June when the intensity of ash production increased. Ash was subsequently reported
over 9,500 m in altitude based on satellite temperature cloud top estimates on several
occasions until early July. Substantial ash clouds, well imaged in satellite data when
weather allowed, emanated from the volcano in nearly all directions over the course of this
period of activity. KVERT daily messages and occasional formal Information Release
statements contained critical observational details including status of the volcano, obser-
vations of ash clouds, and likely motion of the ash given current wind fields (Fig. 8).
During the course of this episode of Klyuchevskoy activity, dozens of aircraft scheduled
to fly NOPAC transition routes chose to fly north or south of the Bering Sea to avoid ash.
Tokyo and Anchorage VAACs and MWOs in Anchorage and Petropavlovsk issued a
number of VAAs and SIGMETs and other aviation weather products (Figs. 9, 10). The
Fig. 8 Portion of a KVERT information release on June 30, 2007, describing ongoing activity and hazards
from the Klyuchevskoy eruption. KVERT warning messages include the use of a Color Code to succinctly
convey the level of concern regarding hazards and the intensity of activity at a particular volcano (Neal et al.
1997). First developed by the Alaska Volcano Observatory during the Mount Redoubt eruption in 1989–
1990, US volcano observatories now use a slightly modified version of the color code (Gardner and Guffanti
2006). RED is the highest level of alert and indicates a significant eruption posing a hazard to aviation is
either underway or expected
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Fig. 9 Portion of a graphical SIGMET issued by the NWS Alaska Aviation Weather Unit in Anchorage on
June 29, 2007, in response to a significant ash cloud produced by Klyuchevskoy Volcano in Kamchatka
(volcano icon). Shown schematically are selected NOPAC and RFE air routes (blue lines). The red hachured
area denotes airspace possibly affected by Klyuchevskoy ash. Text annotation indicates SIGMET identifier
(India 3), expiration date and time, and specific details of the ash cloud (in this case, a cloud reaching flight
level 320 or about 32,000 feet and moving east at 60 knots; the base of the cloud is unknown). The sharp
demarcation of the impact areas with the Flight Information Region (FIR) boundary (black line) reflects
adjoining areas of responsibility in Petropavlovsk, Oakland, and Tokyo ARTCCs. Graphical SIGMETs are
considered an experimental product by NWS and are used as a visual supplement to the official text
SIGMET
Fig. 10 VAA issued by the Tokyo Volcanic Ash Advisory Center on June 29, 2007, in response to ongoing
ash production from Klyuchevskoy Volcano in Kamchatka. Note coordination with Anchorage VAAC
mentioned in the last paragraph
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FAA in Anchorage issued a special volcanic activity Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) to alert
airlines to an ongoing volcanic hazard (Fig. 11) and the Anchorage ARTCC did receive
several pilot reports of ash sightings over the Bering Sea. The exact number of flights
impacted and total flight time lost to re-routing is not known. However, over the course of
more than a month of significant ash cloud production, thousands of aircraft safely
transited the Northern Pacific.
8 Remaining challenges
Despite significant improvements over the past 15 years, mitigation of airborne ash hazards
to aviation in the Northern Pacific faces many ongoing challenges. These include a lack of
sufficient and stable funding to ensure 24/7 monitoring by Russian scientists familiar with
eruptive behavior of Russian volcanoes. The absence of ground-based monitoring instru-
mentation on all but one Kurile volcano and many Kamchatkan volcanoes means that
potentially dangerous eruptions could go unnoticed for many hours. Equipment and
methodologies to validate eruption onset and determine ash-cloud heights (e.g. pressure
sensors, radar, calibrated web-cameras) would substantially improve reliability and accu-
racy of warnings. Other non-technical challenges include an uneven awareness among
international aviation users and officials regarding the risk, an unclear mandate within the
host Russian scientific institutes to conduct applied hazard science and hazard communi-
cations, and language differences among Russian, Japanese, and US organizations with
responsibility to issue warnings.
Solutions for many of these challenges are largely questions of policy, funding, and
education. Those that are technical in nature could be solved in part by expanding scientist-
to-scientist collaboration on topics in volcanology, volcano monitoring, and hazard com-
munications. A comprehensive regional review of volcano warning systems, available
technology, training needs, and interagency communications would be a first step towards
identifying the most important areas for attention as well as strategies for increasing
support. This is especially critical given the frequency of ash cloud production in the
Fig. 11 Portion of an Advisory NOTAM issued by FAA in response to increased activity at Klyuchevskoy
Volcano
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region. From 2005 to 2007, Russian volcanoes generated an average of 2–3 ash clouds
reaching 6 km above sea level or higher each month. Of these, most were produced by
Klyuchevskoy Volcano whose summit elevation of 4,750 m means that ash eruptions can
rapidly reach altitudes of concern to jet traffic.
A long-held tenet of volcano hazard mitigation is that local volcanologic expertise is
essential to conduct effective monitoring and interpretation of volcanic unrest. Efforts over
the past 15 years to develop this infrastructure in the Russian Far East with a capability to
provide effective warnings to the aviation community have mostly succeeded as illustrated
by the record of aviation safety during a time of frequent ash cloud production from
Kamchatka. At the same time, international communication protocols among SVERT,
KVERT, VAACs, MWOs, and other key players have evolved to keep pace with the
increasing demand for rapid delivery of ash cloud warnings. Eruptions in the Russian Far
East have international impacts and thus, international cooperation is required to effec-
tively address these ongoing challenges.
Air traffic in the region is predicted to increase as more routes open over Russia and
demand grows for commercial passenger and cargo flights around the Pacific Rim. Many
segments of the NOPAC and other routes in the region span great distances over-water and
far from alternate airfields, compounding the danger of an ash cloud encounter for the
increasing number of twin-engine aircraft in the fleet mix. Together, these factors under-
score the need to improve monetary support for Russian volcano monitoring efforts and to
ensure that the inter- and intra-governmental procedures are ready to issue effective
warnings. The need is especially acute for the under-monitored Kuriles where no signifi-
cant eruption has occurred for more than two decades.
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